by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, 3 April 2000

Paratroopers have rarely been popular with their conventional brethren or military superiors. In fact, the debate in regard to the necessity, relevance, and status of airborne forces has always been one heavily shrouded in emotion. Nonetheless, there does exist a populist perception of admiration and begrudging respect for those who have earned the right to wear the “wings” denoting service as a paratrooper. Paradoxically, there is also an underlying current of enmity. So what is it about paratroops that has created this schizophrenic outlook of both admiration and disdain? Key to understanding this riddle is a full comprehension of the “Airborne Mystique.”

Since their inception, all paratroopers, no matter what country, have been cloaked in an aura of invincibility which captured the imagination of the public at large.(1) Initially, for propaganda purposes, the government and military carefully nurtured this image. As a result, a portentous and very distinctive concept, referred to as the ‘Airborne Mystique,’ emerged. It was universally applied to all airborne forces and was often credited with providing tangible strength to those who wore the distinguishing Maroon Beret.(2) The allure is as mesmerizing today as it was during the growth of airborne forces during World War II. The ‘mystique’ itself can be explained in part as a product of the time in which it was born. The early years of the Second World War were filled with defeat, humiliation, and withdrawal. Britain and the Commonwealth were pinned to the wall. Survival was tenuous at best and the Axis juggernaut seemed unstoppable. It was a time when the public was thirsty for heroes, which the tough, fearless, highly publicized paratroopers aptly filled. In speaking about their airborne forces American Lieutenant-General E.M. Flanagan wrote, “It builds our morale, it stiffens the spine and braces the backbone of the public to hear talk about the independent type airborne operation.” He elaborated that this was born from the image of an airborne army storming-in “to deal a lethal blow to the enemy, deep in his backyard.”(3)

The appeal of the paratrooper was also due to the symbolism which was attached to the image of the parachute warrior. The use of airborne forces, as exemplified by the stunning German victories in the Low Countries in 1940, represented a revolutionary new form of warfare which exemplified an overwhelmingly offensive spirit. It was a weapon which was perceived to transcend the stifling death, futility and lethargy of trench warfare of the previous war experience. As a result, airborne forces quickly framed the public’s conception of modern war. The paratrooper was portrayed as the leading edge, the “tip of the spear.” Airborne forces were deigned as special troops with a highly dangerous, and extremely hazardous mission to fulfill. Their task was defined as nothing short of facilitating the general advance of the army by seizing key installations and terrain on the enemy’s flanks and in his rear. Furthermore, the paratroopers were responsible for creating “alarm and despondency”and complete confusion in the antagonist’s safe areas at the most critical moments of attack. Justified or not, they became associated with the necessary prerequisites for military success.(4)

The imagery of the warrior dropping ‘out of the heavens’ to smite the villainous aggressor appealed to all. It was the perfect combination of the sanctity of individual human effort within the larger and often smothering aspect of modern technological mass warfare. In 1944, one reporter noted, “publicity has placed the emphasis on the jump from the aircraft.” However, “the jump,” he quickly explained, “represented only about two percent of the paratrooper’s actually training.”(5) Nonetheless, to the public airborne forces became synonymous with offensive spirit and capability. They represented, in the layman’s perception, the sword which could slay the enemy in his deepest redoubt. Furthermore, airborne forces were accepted by many as the personification of modern warfare. More important, the paratroopers themselves were lauded as the epitome of the ultimate warrior.(6)

Overtime, the military institution, government propaganda, Hollywood stereotypes, and particularly the airborne soldiers themselves, actively promoted this ‘superman’ image of the paratrooper. Maintenance of morale and support of the war effort were important factors behind the campaign. Notwithstanding that, the paratrooper himself became the primary reason for the perpetuation of the ‘mystique.’ It was quickly apparent that he was undoubtably a different breed from his more conventional infantry brethren. The airborne soldier was indeed special and he truly epitomized the nation’s premier land warrior.(7)

The justification for this assertion is not difficult to identify. Behavioural scientists have tendered the observation that airborne units clearly enshrine military virtues. They explained that paratroopers are self-selected and stress such values as courage and excitement and are oriented toward action and combat.(8) Sociology professor, Donna Winslow of the University of Ottawa, has concluded that “the Airborne didn’t just espouse traditional institutional values of combat / warrior, it embodied them and in many ways exaggerated them.”(9)

Why is this so? The strength of the paratrooper goes beyond individual willingness to join. Despite the voluntary nature of airborne soldiering, the selection and training were rigorous and exceptionally discriminating. The complex and dangerous nature of the operations required what was described as an “elite” type of soldier. Military historian and author, Clay Blair, stated that the aspiring paratrooper had to be in superb physical condition in order to withstand the shock of the jump and the hard landing. Furthermore, he insisted that the airborne warrior required nerves of steel.(10) Larry Gough, a writer for the American Liberty magazine, recorded, “In the first place, they [parachutists] are perfect specimens. They have to be because their work is rough tough and full of excellent opportunities to get hurt. Mentally they’re quick on the trigger, again because their job demands it, because split seconds can make the difference between instant death or a successfully completed job.”(11)

But, the selection criterion was not the only factor to explain the paratrooper’s esteemed position as the epitome of the modern combat soldier. The airborne reputation grew further as a direct result of their demanding training and hard-earned combat record. The well-respected Brigadier James Hill, Commander of the British 3rd Parachute Brigade during the Second World War, simply described parachute troops as the best fighting material in the world. He felt that “the parachutists have shown themselves magnificent infantry, pre-eminent in physique and steadiness of nerve, born guerilla fighters, mobile and tireless, tremendous marchers, and of an undefeated spirit.”(12)

The aura around airborne soldiers was also rooted in the nature of parachuting itself. It captivated the public because of its daring, hazardous nature. General-Leutnant Bruno Brauer, a paratrooper who participated in the invasion of the Low Countries in 1940, as a member of the German Parachute Regiment, captured the essence of the ‘airborne’ allure. Parachuting, he said, “compresses into the space of seconds feelings of concentrated energy, tenseness and abandon; it alone demands a continual and unconditional readiness to risk one’s life. Therefore the parachutist experiences the most exalted feelings of which human beings are capable, namely that of victory over one’s self.” Brauer concluded, “for us parachutists, the words of the poet, who said that unless you stake your life you will never win it, is no empty phrase.”(13)

Parachuting, as Brauer well knew, demands a continual testing of oneself. It requires the individual to repeatedly overcome the fear of jumping – and this is even before the fear of battle. This recurring necessity, the dangerous parachute descent, fuels the mystique and provides the major difference between airborne forces and other units. This is not a trivial distinction. The nucleus of the British Parachute Regiment was drawn, in 1940, from the renown No.2 Commando. Nonetheless, the official history of the British Airborne Forces recorded that “these men were tough, but even so all of them could not manage parachuting.”(14) The Canadian experience was similar. Parachute training was the preliminary step in training for the First Special Service Force. This was done to test individuals on whether or not they had the nerve to go through the commando-type training which followed. Of the first draft of 450 individuals, representing the “cream of Canada’s hard-fighting army youth,” approximately 7% froze in the ‘door’ and were immediately returned to their parent units.(15) Similarly, a postwar report revealed that some men who displayed great bravery during the war could not bring themselves to jump from an aircraft.(16)

For the military, parachuting provided an excellent device for attracting and screening

individuals for courage and motivation. It “created elitism through an ordeal that tested a man’s courage and earnestness before combat.”(17) This was the essence of the paratrooper’s strength. Lord (Sir Charles Wilson) Moran in his classic work, The Anatomy of Courage, theorized that courage was “a moral quality” and “not a chance gift of nature.” He asserted that “it is the cold choice between two alternatives, it is the fixed resolve not to quit, an act of renunciation which must be made not once but many times by the power of will.” “Courage,” Moran concluded, “is willpower.”(18)

It is this courage, the ability to repeatedly overcome fear and carry on with the mission, which provides the paratrooper with enormous pride and self-confidence. He continually bested his apprehension and personal trepidation. As a result, the airborne soldier is confident in his ability to overcome future tests of will. Sir John W. Hackett, a veteran of the “bridge to far” at Arnhem in 1944, remembered that the act of parachuting provided each member with the knowledge that “he had won a very important victory over himself.”(19) Another veteran British paratrooper, Lieutenant-General F.A.M. Browning commented, “Once a man has parachuted he feels he has done something that few other people do willingly. In some way it gives him a sense of superiority over all other troops.”(20)

The transformation of the individual due to this new strength, borne from confidence, has a very tangible effect on the individual. Confidence has been described as perhaps the greatest source of emotional strength that a soldier can rely on.(21) Studies have shown that “the general level of anxiety in combat would tend to be reduced insofar as the men derived from training a high degree of self-confidence about their ability to take care of themselves.” It was further concluded that “troops who expressed a high degree of self-confidence before combat were more likely to perform with relatively little fear during battle.”(22)

The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion War Diary captured the essence of this evolution. One entry revealed, “the average young parachutist upon graduation from our four week course of the U.S. Parachute School can be aptly described as a ‘Bull in a China Shop.'” The account stated that “the psychological transformation of the mind of the introvert to the extrovert is apparent in most of our young chutists after completing their qualifying jumps and the course of Judo. They became fearless and to a degree reckless.” The writer further observed that they “feel as though they have been given the key to all physical success and conquered all phases of fear.”(23)

These observations were not unique but rather highlighted the importance of parachuting to the military. American Major-General A.S. Newman believed that parachuting proves the “will to dare.”(24) He further elaborated:

Parachute jumping tests and hardens a soldier under stress in a way nothing short of battle can do. You never know about others. But paratroopers will fight. You can bet on that. They repeatedly face danger while jumping and develop self-discipline that conquers fear. Subconsciously every trooper knows this. That’s why he has that extra cocky confidence. (25)

Similarly, another American, Major-General Willard Pearson declared, “If you want to select a group of people who are willing to fight, well, one of the best criteria I know is whether or not they will jump out of an airplane. Now that is not to say that some of the others won’t fight, but sure as hell the airborne will.”(26) Ward Just, author and former military correspondent, held similar views in that to be “airborne” is viewed as “prima facie evidence of energy, initiative, and bravery.”(27) It is these attitudes and perceptions, compounded by the continual ‘testing and hardening’ of the individual which nourishes and sustains the ‘Airborne Mystique.’ By the same token, it is also the reason the paratrooper has developed the Hollywood stereotype of the exceptionally fit, fearless and aggressive braggart, who is always spoiling for a fight.

By the end of the Second World War the paratrooper personified the elite fighting man. The public, and large segments of the military institution itself, perceived the airborne warrior as the epitome of a nation’s warrior caste. Peacetime soldiering quickly heightened this notion. Military historian, S.L.A. Marshall wrote that until men are severely tried, there is no conclusive test of their discipline, nor proof that their training at arms is satisfying a legitimate military end.(28) During a war, combat becomes the great equalizer; all combat units eventually are tested under fire. However, in peacetime no such army-wide validation exists.

It is for this reason that parachuting and the contrived ‘superiority’ of airborne units took on importance. The act of jumping from aircraft provided a vehicle to test soldiers in the absence of real action. Gideon Aran, a former Israeli paratrooper and sociologist at the University of Chicago, insisted that parachuting creates and reinforces action-seeking dispositions. This in turn, he concluded, guaranteed a better distribution of manpower within the army, based on the premise that action seekers are better suited for combat than for other roles.(29)

The exaggerated importance and virility associated with paratroopers, however, are loaded with potential peril. Physically demanding training and the successful completion of the parachutist qualification nurtures a fearlessness borne from self-confidence. Furthermore, even the newest paratrooper is automatically associated with a legacy of daring deeds and unrivalled feats-of-arms, which were dearly paid for in blood by those who came before. In short, the most novice airborne warrior is instantly cloaked in the mantle of the ‘Airborne Mystique.’ Therefore, it is not surprising that the individual, as well as the group, quickly see themselves as distinct and special, literally a breed apart.

Inherently, any airborne ‘band’ quickly defines itself, whether publicly or internally, as elite. This definition and perception are further exacerbated by the treatment bestowed on the group by the institution as a whole. From the airborne’s earliest beginnings, the hazardous nature of its role necessitated special perks from the military establishment, if for no other reason than to attract volunteers. Special pay, distinctive insignia and uniforms reflected their exclusive status.(30) It also contributed to their arrogance. The contemporary Canadian example was no different. Despite emphatic denials, special consideration was given to Canada’s airborne forces. They were entitled special orders of dress and distinctive clothing items; allowance to wear unique insignia; privileged access to special courses; and a greater number of foreign exchanges for training.(31)

The intense ‘esprit de corps’ and elitist sentiment which is nurtured by the group, and promoted and / or tolerated by the chain of command, has definite value. However, this ‘cult of the elite’ attitude which can be spawned also has its pitfalls. Namely, the airborne can quickly devolve into an exclusive club which shuns, and if allowed, abhors outsiders.

The self-transformation of the paratrooper into a closed ‘warrior tribe’ of its own is not difficult to understand. The farewell message from Major-General Crabbe, a former paratrooper and Special Service Force (SSF) Commander, on the occasion of the Canadian Airborne Regiment’s disbandment ceremonies in March 1995, captured the sentiment of the exclusivity of the airborne family. “To have felt the rush of wind in the door – to have experienced the sheer exhilaration that comes each time one exits an aircraft trusting one’s life to the professionalism of comrades,” he wrote, “binds all jumpers in a special fraternity.”(32) Similarly, Lieutenant-General Kent Foster, the last Colonel of the Regiment, The Canadian Airborne Regiment, asserted, “Only those who have dared will understand the call of the jumpmaster, the weight of a winter rucksack, the tap on the shoulder and the cry of ‘have a good one!'”(33)

It is this “special fraternity” which is both the strength and the greatest weakness of the airborne family. Unique to the paratroops is the fact that all officers and men undergo identical training and are faced with the same tests of courage, endurance and strength. There are no shortcuts for anyone. Colonel Kenward recognized that “it is impossible to hide weakness in the Airborne.”(34) As a result of the exacting standards that all must meet, as well as the shared hardships, a bond is created based on group identity, mutual respect and solidarity. Membership in the airborne fraternity cannot be bestowed due to affluence, connections, or rank. It must be earned. A British Company Sergeant-Major, from 2 Parachute Regiment professed that the officers and men rely on one another. He maintained that “a special bond was created because of the fact that the men knew that the officers, like them, endured the same difficult training prior to arriving at Regiment.”(35)

As already noted, this unique shared experience builds group cohesion and solidarity. This is significant. Sociologists have argued that high standards and requirements to enter into a group result in a greater sense of commitment and value placed on membership to that group by successful candidates.(36) In simple terms, the greater the degree of challenge, hardship and danger, the greater is the development of mutual respect and affiliation.(37) This strong bond generates the aggressive attitude, sense of invincibility and cohesiveness which exists within airborne units. Samuel Stouffer’s monumental study of battlefield behaviour, The American Soldier, indicated that 80% of respondents believed that a strong group integration was the main reason for stamina in combat. This study also observed that motivation is primarily dependent on group cohesion and that group cohesion in turn, is the decisive factor for combat efficiency. The steadfast self-confidence in oneself and in one’s fellow soldiers engenders a belief and philosophy that there is no mission that cannot be accomplished.(38)

Herein lies the fundamental efficacy of the “Airborne Mystique.” The mystique is merely the reflection of the strength of character, confidence and pride inherent in earning the right to wear the Maroon Beret. It is the belief in oneself and the mutual trust of comrades; the sense of invincibility, the boldness and the conviction that any mission, despite the hazards, can be overcome. It is the personal pride and fortitude which are derived from a high state of physical fitness, professional skills and demanding training. These enhance the paratrooper’s courage and enable him to continually overcome fear. Collectively the mystique manifests itself in the form of highly motivated units, capable of executing any assigned mission regardless of environmental conditions or reigning chaos. In essence, the “Airborne Mystique” is rooted in the acceptance of unlimited challenge and a commitment to excellence.

This tenet of airborne soldiering fuels the admiration and respect of others. To many, the paratrooper epitomizes fearlessness and an unrivalled tenacity for mission completion. Quite simply, airborne soldiers are seen to embody the warrior spirit. But what of the paradox? Unfortunately, the same camaraderie, esprit de corps, and tight bond, forged through demanding and dangerous training, which provides the strength of airborne units is also their Achilles heel. The airborne’s inward focus creates an aloofness which embraces fellow members of the airborne fraternity, from whatever country, yet dismisses, even shuns others in their own military institution. It is this callous treatment of others, and an often contrived self-indulgent false sense of elitism which invites the antagonism and disdain of others.

Not surprisingly, this state of affairs exacerbates the malevolent debate that often rages over airborne forces. Emotion rather than objectivity becomes the driving force behind the thinking process of airborne supporters, as well as their detractors. Predictably, decisions are often taken for the wrong reason with detrimental consequences. The key to solving the paradox is to assure that airborne units within an institution are given a clear, credible mandate. More important, however, is the necessity to staff airborne organizations with mature, proven leaders who can ensure that the ‘mystique’ is manifested in deed rather than just in word. Failure to adhere to such simple principles indubitably leads to the alienation and marginalization, if not the complete destruction, of a valuable military capability.

ENDNOTES

1. Airborne soldiers in the context of this article are defined as paratroopers and glider borne infantry.

2. The Maroon Beret denotes service in an airborne unit in most NATO countries. This practise does not necessarily apply globally. For instance, Russian airborne forces wear blue berets. However, the Maroon Beret in this article will be used to connote service in any airborne unit.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Flanagan, “Give Airborne Spurs,” Infantry School Quarterly, Vol 39, No. 2, October 1951, 33.

4. Hilary St. George Saunders. The Red Beret. The Story of the Parachute Regiment at War 1940-1945. London: Michael Joseph, 1950, 103; and William Cockerham, “Selective Socialization: Airborne Training as Status Passage,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol 1, No. 2, Fall 1973, 216.

5. Trent Frayne, “Parachute Course Aim is Tough Fighting Man,” 17 July 1944, Canadian Airborne Forces Museum (AB Museum) Files.

6. Saunders, 320; W.B. Breuer, Geronimo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 9; John Talbot, “The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the Algerian War,” Armed Forces and Society, November 1976, 71-72; and Roger Beaumont, Military Elites, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Coy Inc., 1974), 101.

7. The 82nd Airborne Division was reported to have emerged from Normandy with the reputation of being “a pack of jackals; the toughest, most resourceful and bloodthirsty infantry in the ETO.” Clay Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers. The American Airborne in World War II (New York: The Dial Press, 1985), 295.

8. D.R. Segal, J.J. Harris, J.M. Rothberg, and D.H. Marlowe, “Paratroopers as Peacekeepers,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol 10, No, 4, Summer 1984, 489; and W.C. Cockerham, “Attitudes Toward Combat Among U.S. Army Paratroopers,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol 6, Spring 1978, 11.

9. Donna Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia. A Socio-cultural Inquiry (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 47.

10. Blair, 27. See also Saunders, 317.

11. Larry Gough, “Parachutists Want it Tough,” Liberty, 4 December 1943. AB Museum files.

12. “3rd Parachute Brigade – Training Instruction No. 3,” 23 July 1943, 2 & 6. Canadian Forces Director of History and Heritage (henceforth DHH) 145.4036 (D1).

13. Maurice Newnham, “Parachute Soldiers,” RUSI, Vol 65, No. 580, November 1950, 592. General-Leutnant Brauer commanded a German parachute regiment during the invasion of the Low Countries in 1940.

14. Dr. Terry White, The Making of the World’s Elite Forces (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd., 1992), 14. Another reference is made in Capt Newnham’s Prelude to Glory, where the author stated, “…the majority got to the edge of the hole in the aircraft before refusing. Four men fainted in the aircraft, while a number jumped in a state of collapse having forced themselves to do so by sheer willpower.”

15. War Diary of the 2nd Parachute Battalion with 1 Special Service Force Serial 1354, Canadian National Archives (henceforth NA), RG 24, Vol 15301 & 15302, Vol 9 – War Diary SSF Bn, 1 April 1943 – 30 April 1943, enclosed articles “First Jump ‘Disappointing’ to Many – ‘Over too Soon,'” and Don Mason, “‘Air Commandos’ will Strike hard at Axis.”

16. Major J.S. Hitsman, “Medical Problems of Paratroop Training,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol 4, No. 1, April 1950, 17.

17. Beaumont, Military Elites, 101.

18. Sir Charles Wilson (Lord) Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (New York: Avery Publishing Group Inc, 1987), 61. Lord Moran was a front line Medical Officer during World War I and the personal physician to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II.

19. Roger A. Beaumont, “Airborne: Life Cycle of a Military Subculture,” Military Review, Vol 51, No. 6, 53.

20. Lieutenant-General F.A.M. Browning, “Airborne Forces,” RUSI, Vol 89, No. 556, November 1944, 353.

21. B.M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: New York: Free Press, 1985), 69.

It was further noted that with confidence a soldier willingly faces the enemy and withstands deprivations, minor setbacks, and extreme stress, knowing he and his unit are capable of succeeding.

22. S.J. Rachman, Fear and Courage (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1990) 63-64. Studies have also shown that well-led and cohesive units tended to have fewer stress casualties than units lower in these qualities. J.G. Hunt, and J.D. Blair, Leadership on the Future Battlefield (New York: Brassey’s, 1986), 215.

23. 1 Canadian Parachute Battalion, War Diaries, 15 January 1943. AB Museum, File A84.019.01, January 1943, Envelope 2 of 22.

24. Major-General A.S. Newman, What Are Generals Made Of? Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987, 197.

25. Ibid, 193. Gideon Aran observed that “jumping encourages self-confidence, determination, self-reliance, masterful activity, aggression, courage, and other items symptomatic of the phallic-narcissistic type, all of which are very important in military setting, especially in paratroop commando units, which rely heavily on individual action and are aggressive in nature.” Gideon Aran, “Parachuting,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol 80, No. 1, 147.

26. Ward Just, Military Men (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 130. Research has indicated that airborne troops were more willing to deploy for combat than personnel in more conventional ground manoeuvre units. Segal, “Paratroopers as Peacekeepers,” 489.

27. Just, 130. John Talbot described the “esprit para” as the “rejection of materialism, the exaltation of the asceticism, violence and risk, of action for action’s sake.” Talbot, 75.

28. S.L.A. Marshall, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 1950), 141.

29. Aran, 148.

30. Cockerham, “Selective Socialization,” 216; Beaumont, “Airborne,” 53; “Training Paratroops,” CATM, No. 20, November 1942, 10; and “3rd Parachute Training Instruction No. 3,” A1. DHH 145.4036 (D1).

31. Winslow, 132.

32. Message, CCUNPROFOR Commander 095, 041202Z Mar 95, “Canadian Airborne Regiment – Laying Up of Colours.”

33. Lieutenant-General K. Foster, “Remarks by the Colonel of the Regiment,” Maroon Beret, Final Edition, November 1995, 4.

34. Interview with author, 4 October 1996.

35. Rory Bridson, The Making of a Para (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1989), 81. Major-General Neuman declared, “There’s a close bond between the airborne soldier and his officer, because each knows the other has passed the jump test. And they continue to do so together. Each believes the other will be a good man to have around when things get sweaty.” Newman, 193.

36. E. Aronson and J. Mills, “The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group,” Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 1957, 157-158. Elliot Aronson of Stanford University and Judson Mills of the U.S. Army Leadership and Human Research Unit established this in their 1959 laboratory experiments. They stated, “Subjects who underwent a severe initiation perceived the group as being significantly more attractive than those who underwent a mild or no initiation.” See also R.B. Cialdini, R.B. Influence. Science & Practise, 3rd ed. (Arizona: Harper Collins, 1993), 70 &74; and Major James McCollum, “The Airborne Mystique,” Military Review, Vol 56, No. 11, November 1976, 16.

37. W.D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1985), 14.

38. Elmar Dinter, Hero or Coward (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 41; and Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation (Boston: Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 45-46.

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